

ANTISEMITISM POLICY TRUST



THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN BRITAIN:

ENTRYISM, SEPARATISM, ANTISEMITISM,
AND THE THREAT TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Executive Summary

- **Strategic Shift:** As the Muslim Brotherhood faces crackdowns in the Middle East, the UK has become a primary operational and financial hub for its European network. Central to this, is a strategy of slow, gradual and non-violent institutional entrenchment.
- **Ideological Conveyor Belt:** By fostering antisemitism, conspiracy narratives, and anti-Western sentiment, the movement creates the “cultural soil” for radicalisation and social division.
- **A Layered Network:** Rather than a visible hierarchy, the movement operates via a three-tier structure (Core Cadres, Affiliated Civil Groups, and Influenced Entities) to maintain plausible deniability.
- **Institutional Entryism and Subversion:** MB-aligned actors deploy “double discourse” – projecting moderation publicly while advancing non-integration, eroding counter-extremism programs (Prevent), and targeting academia, politics, civil society, and media.
- **Policy Imperative:** The UK should follow the US in proscribing the foreign chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood, but this will have only limited effect on countering its institutional infiltration in the UK. It must therefore move beyond a reactive counter-terrorism model toward a proactive counter-infiltration strategy, utilising civil non-engagement, transparency registers, and institutional vetting.

Introduction

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), or *Jamā'at al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn*, is a transnational Sunni Islamist movement that constitutes one of the most significant ideological challenges to liberal democratic orders in the 21st century. It was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, and has developed an international network since at least the 1950s, for which Europe has been an important base.¹ Today, it operates as a sophisticated, multi-tiered global network that has successfully transitioned from a revolutionary Middle Eastern movement into a participationist force within Western societies, including in the United Kingdom.

Several Arab nations view the MB as an existential threat, and the organisation is proscribed in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Jordan. Beyond

the Middle East, the MB is designated as a terrorist organisation by Russia. The United States has opted for a surgical approach by banning several branches, rather than a blanket ban on the global movement.² This model avoids the legal difficulties of defining the whole Brotherhood while still addressing risks from its violent wing. In Europe there is now a move to contain or ban the organisation. Austria banned the symbols and flags of the Muslim Brotherhood – a model now also pursued by Germany. The French National Assembly adopted a resolution calling on the EU to place the Muslim Brotherhood on its list of terrorist organisations. France is also leading the charge to redefine “Islamist separatism” as a form of institutional subversion. By comparison, the UK has been the most lenient on the MB.

"The movement pursues a strategy of gradual, non-violent infiltration and influence within Western societies rather than an immediate, violent revolution."

Evidential and Terminological Note

The term “Muslim Brotherhood” is used in this briefing to refer to a diverse and decentralised transnational movement rather than a single centrally controlled organisation operating through a conventional hierarchical structure. The strength of evidence for connections between the Brotherhood and individual organisations varies considerably. Where formal affiliation, historical membership or documented organisational links are established, these are identified as such. Where the evidence instead concerns ideological convergence, shared personnel, collaboration, common political objectives or similar

narratives, the briefing distinguishes these forms of association from formal affiliation.

The presence of ideological or strategic overlap should not, in itself, be taken as evidence that an organisation is controlled by or formally affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The briefing therefore seeks to distinguish between documented organisational relationships, historical or personnel connections, and broader ideological or strategic convergence. Where evidence is incomplete or contested, this is explicitly acknowledged.

Ideology and Vision

The Brotherhood’s core credo – “God is our objective; the Quran is our law; the Prophet is our leader; jihad is our way; and death for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations” – reflects a totalising ideology. It views Islam not merely as a religion, but as a comprehensive political and legal system (Sharia) intended to govern all aspects of private and public life.

Central to its Western strategy is the doctrine of *Tamkeen* (institutional entrenchment). Unlike jihadist groups that

seek immediate violent overthrow, the MB pursues a strategy of gradual, non-violent infiltration and influence within Western societies rather than an immediate, violent revolution.³ This involves the gradual Islamisation of society from the bottom up, aiming to create a parallel social and legal infrastructure that eventually supersedes the secular state. Leading ideologues like the late Yusuf al-Qaradawi explicitly framed this as a “conquest” of Europe through *Da’wah* (proselytising) and ideological infiltration rather than the sword.⁴

Hizb ut-Tahrir: A Distinct but Related Islamist Current

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) should be distinguished organisationally from the Muslim Brotherhood, but is relevant to the wider discussion of Islamist political ideology and its relationship with antisemitism, separatism and terrorism. Founded in Jerusalem in 1953, HuT is an international Sunni Islamist political organisation whose stated long-term objective is to unite Muslims under a Caliphate governed by Sharia law. The UK Government identifies Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain as the organisation’s official UK branch, established in the 1980s, and assesses the British branch as part of a coherent global organisation.⁵

Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, HuT has now crossed the UK’s statutory terrorism threshold.⁶ The organisation was proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000 on 19 January 2024. The Home Office concluded that HuT was “concerned in terrorism” because it promoted and encouraged terrorism, including through its praise and celebration of the 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks. The Government specifically cited HuT’s description of Hamas members responsible for the attacks as “heroes” and its history of praising attacks against Israel and Jews.⁷

The proscription is significant because it demonstrates that Islamist organisations can move from operating within the political and ideological sphere into the legal category of terrorism even where their primary

activity is not the direct perpetration of terrorist attacks. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation subsequently confirmed that the trigger for proscription was HuT's celebration of 7 October, its encouragement of further terrorist activity, and its long-standing record of praising attacks against Israel and Jews.⁸

HuT therefore provides an important case study in the relationship between extremist ideology, antisemitism


and the legitimisation of terrorism. It also illustrates the danger of treating "non-violent Islamist" organisations as inherently moderate. The relevant distinction is not simply whether an organisation itself carries out violence, but whether its ideology, propaganda and political activity promote hatred, undermine liberal democratic principles, or create a permissive environment for terrorism.

The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Architecture

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) does not operate in Western liberal democracies as a monolith. Instead, it utilises a sophisticated, decentralised organisational model. This structure is designed for resilience, adaptability and longevity, allowing the movement to pursue a long-term goal of *Tamkeen* while maintaining a high degree of plausible deniability regarding its extremist ideological roots. It is not a formal structural organisation in the West. Instead, a range of organisations and individuals have been identified as affiliated with, historically connected to, ideologically influenced by, or operating in proximity to the movement – making it extremely difficult to identify and contain.⁹

By operating through a polycentric network rather than a single command-and-control centre, the MB can adapt to local legal frameworks and political climates in the West. This "starfish" model ensures that even if one node is compromised or proscribed, the broader movement survives and continues its "march through the institutions".¹⁰

Researchers at George Washington University's Program on Extremism have studied the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe and the United States extensively. They categorise the movement's Western operations into three distinct, overlapping tiers:¹¹



Tier I: The "Pure" Brothers (The Core Cadre)

At the centre of the web are the "Pure Brothers" – senior cadres who have typically emigrated from the movement's primary branches in Egypt, Libya, Iraq, or the Levant. These individuals are the ideological and strategic custodians of the movement.

- **Role and Function:** This core group remains part of the formal, often secretive, international structure of the MB. They are dependent on, and loyal to, the "Mother" branches in the Middle East.
- **Strategic Objectives:** In the UK and Europe, these senior leaders manage high-level international lobbying, secure significant funding from state or private donors in the Gulf, and coordinate media strategies aimed at destabilising Middle Eastern regimes they oppose.
- **Tactical Plausible Deniability:** While they represent the "true" Brotherhood, they rarely operate in the public eye as such. Instead, they act as the silent directors behind the scenes, ensuring that the movement's global vision is translated into local action.

Tier II: Brotherhood Affiliates (The "Spawn" Organisations)

The second tier consists of organisations established by individuals with strong, often life-long personal ties to the Brotherhood.

- **Operational Independence:** While they share the MB's totalising worldview – viewing Islam as a

comprehensive political and legal system – these groups operate with complete structural independence from the formal MB hierarchy.

- **The “New” Muslim Brotherhood:** In the UK, this tier includes prominent civil society organisations like the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and has included the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS)¹²¹³. In recent years, MEND (Muslim Engagement and Development) has also emerged as a significant Tier II actor; while officially independent, it is identified by the UK government as having an ‘Islamist orientation’ and serves the movement’s strategic goals by using the language of civil liberties to institutionalise MB-aligned narratives within local government and the media.¹⁴ The Muslim Vote campaign, which describes itself as “a dynamic coalition of organisations and individuals”¹⁵, is powered by several organisations including MEND and the MAB, and shares significant overlap in leadership and goals with those groups.¹⁶

- **Strategy of Entryism:** These affiliates position themselves as the “moderate” and primary interlocutors between the Muslim community and the state. By jockeying for position as representatives to the government, they seek to monopolise the “Muslim voice” in policy discussions regarding education, counter-extremism, and foreign policy.


Tier III: Influenced Entities (The “Trojan Horses”)

The third and broadest category consists of organisations and institutions for which there is less direct evidence of formal organisational affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. These may include charities, educational organisations, professional bodies, campaign groups and other civil-society actors whose activities or public positions sometimes overlap with narratives, objectives or policy priorities associated with Brotherhood-linked organisations.

It is important to distinguish ideological or strategic convergence from organisational affiliation. Evidence that an organisation has adopted a position also promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood, worked with a Brotherhood-linked organisation, or shared personnel or platforms does not, by itself, establish that the organisation is controlled by, affiliated with, or acting on behalf of the Brotherhood.

Nevertheless, these areas of convergence are relevant to understanding the wider environment in which Islamist ideas gain political and institutional traction and are utilised for subversion. For example, normalising Muslim Brotherhood-inspired narratives in the mainstream, such as the rejection of integration and the institutionalisation of Sharia-compliant moral frameworks within civil society.

Where organisations repeatedly amplify similar narratives, collaborate on campaigns, share speakers or personnel, or oppose the same counter-extremism measures, these patterns may create networks of influence and mutual reinforcement, even in the absence of formal organisational links. The policy challenge is therefore not simply to identify formal membership or organisational control. It is also to understand how ideas, personnel, funding, platforms and political campaigns can move between organisations that remain formally independent. Claims of Brotherhood affiliation should be made only where there is specific evidence establishing such a connection, but this is also where the strength of these entities lies: because they lack clear operational links to the MB, they are difficult to categorise or monitor. They often receive public funding or government recognition, inadvertently granting state legitimacy to organisations whose positions or ideological affiliations warrant greater scrutiny and may be a national security risk. This is the reason they are considered a Trojan Horse and are arguably the most useful path for subversion.



The French Ministry of the Interior 2025 Report

The May 2025 declassified report by the French Ministry of the Interior, provides a critical contemporary assessment of Muslim Brotherhood (MB) operations. It identifies a “discreet and methodical” strategy of societal entryism designed to install ideological hegemony by infiltrating civil society under the guise of religious and educational activities. The report warns that the MB represents an “insidious and progressive” threat to national cohesion, aiming to gradually replace secular democratic norms with a social order governed by Sharia law. Crucially, they use a method of Double Discourse: Projecting a polished, moderate image to the public and officials while promoting separatism and gender segregation in private or internal circles.

The report details how the MB targets four critical domains: religious infrastructure, education, digital media, and local government. By integrating into school boards, municipal councils, and neighbourhood associations, MB-linked figures deliver “community services” that build social capital and trust, which is then used to leverage political concessions. The MB create private schools (e.g., the Lycée Averroès in Lille) to shape the worldview of the youth. MB-linked figures integrate into local councils to influence decision-making and secure funding for projects. They control mosques (approx. 140 in France, or 7% of total) to use as platforms for ideological hegemony.

The report validates the three-tier model, noting that while the “Pure Brothers” (Tier I) remain hidden, they use “Trojan Horse” organisations (Tier III) to promote a separatist mindset. This encourages Muslim youth to prioritise a narrow religious identity over national belonging, effectively fracturing social cohesion.

While the MB avoids direct violence in the West, the report labels it an “ideological conveyor belt.” By promoting a worldview that is fundamentally hostile to secularism and liberal values, the movement creates the “cultural soil” in which more violent radicalisation can flourish. The report notes that many individuals who later join jihadist groups like ISIS or Al-Qaeda began their ideological journey within Brotherhood-influenced circles.

A significant portion of the report documents a surge in antisemitism and anti-Zionist rhetoric following the October 7 attacks. The report notes a significant rise in antisemitic and anti-Zionist activities within MB-influenced mosques, particularly following the October 7 attacks. It argues that the movement exploits the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to fuel anger and justify extremist rhetoric against democratic states. The MB is accused of exploiting regional conflicts to fuel a visceral hatred of Jews, often masked as political activism. This narrative dehumanises “others” and justifies hostility toward the state, leading to a direct increase in antisemitic incidents and threats against Jewish communities.

A central finding of the French report is the pivotal role of the United Kingdom as the primary operational and financial hub for the Brotherhood’s European network. The authors note that as the movement faces a decline in the Arab world, it has pivoted its resources toward Europe, with the UK serving as a sanctuary for senior leadership and a coordination centre for transnational funding. The report explicitly identifies UK-based entities as being involved in the financial and ideological support of Brotherhood networks across France and Northern Europe, leveraging Britain’s relatively permissive regulatory environment to manage a “sprawling archipelago” of international associations.

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The report suggests that the MB’s use of ‘double discourse’ has allowed it to penetrate British institutions more deeply than previously understood. It warns that unless the UK adopts a more rigorous “non-engagement” policy, the Brotherhood will continue to use its British base to destabilise social harmony across the continent.

The Threat to the United Kingdom and Liberal Democracy

In the UK, the 2015 *Muslim Brotherhood Review* commissioned by the government (but never published in full) concluded that the group's foundational ideology are "contrary to our values and have been contrary to our national interests and our national security."¹⁷ The threat is not primarily one of immediate street violence, but of social subversion. By exploiting liberal multiculturalism, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) seeks to bypass democratic scrutiny and reshape British society from within.

A 2019 Commission for Countering Extremism paper names the organisations directly affiliated with the MB in the UK:

"The first mainstream Islamist organisations, established by Jamaati and Brotherhood cadres in the 1960s and 1970s, include the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS); the UK Islamic Mission (UKIM); the Muslim Educational Trust (MET); Muslim Welfare House; the Islamic Foundation; and Dawatul Islam UK & Eire. In the 1980s and 1990s came the Islamic Sharia Council; Muslim Aid; the Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE); the Association of Muslim Schools UK (AMS-UK); the Palestinian Relief and Development Fund (Interpal); and the Palestine Return Centre. In 1997, three important organisations were founded, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB); the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB); and the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC). In the 2000s, additional groups were established, reflecting a further diversification of Islamist interests, including Cage (initially called Cageprisoners); the Islam Channel; the Cordoba Foundation; Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND, initially called iEngage); and the Middle East Monitor."

It documents how MB and Jamaat-e-Islami-linked networks have used education to transmit illiberal values, including segregation, *hudud* punishments,¹⁸ and opposition to secular democracy, often framing such efforts as cultural preservation while directly contrasting with British values of individual liberty and equality.¹⁹ The analysis details how groups like the Muslim Educational Trust (MET) and the Association of Muslim Schools UK (AMS-UK) have influenced school curricula and teacher training, promoting books that

sanction polygamy, prohibit interfaith marriage, and view man-made law as inferior to Sharia.²⁰

As seen in reports that detail Muslim Brotherhood infiltration in France²¹ and the US,²² this subversion is driven by the doctrine of strategic entrenchment of the movement within the host state's institutional fabric. Rather than seeking a sudden revolutionary overthrow, the MB pursues a strategy to influence national policies, local and national politics, educational institutions, civil society organisations, and discourse, aiming to subtly reorganise society until the acceptance of an Islamist social and legal order becomes widespread.

This strategy is operationalised through three primary pillars:

1. Monopolising Representation

The MB's most successful tactic in the UK has been its ability to position its affiliates as the main, authoritative interlocutors for the "Muslim community." Organisations including the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) have historically positioned themselves as the primary partner for government engagement. By doing so, they marginalise the vast majority of British Muslims who hold secular, reformist, or simply non-Islamist views.

The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) – historically influenced by MB/Jamaat-e-Islami thinking²³ – has long sought and gained government dialogue, including on faith advisory roles and policy input. Despite a 2009 engagement freeze, recent developments (for example, the 2025-6 Lord Macdonald review into public order and hate crime laws²⁴) show continued engagement.

This creates a representation trap where the state inadvertently grants legitimacy and public platforms to a movement whose ultimate goals are illiberal. The MB uses this perceived mandate to amplify a siege mentality, portraying any criticism of Islamist ideology as an attack on Islam itself. This tactical use of identity politics silences internal dissent within Muslim communities and ensures that MB-aligned voices dominate the narrative on everything from foreign policy to local planning.

2. Subverting Policymaking Through Entryism

The MB's entryism extends into the very heart of the British state: politics, the civil service, and local government. By encouraging members and sympathisers to enter these spheres, the movement seeks to influence legislation and administrative creep in its favour.²⁵

• **Politics and Civil Service:** MB-linked actors often seek positions on advisory boards, interfaith councils, and within political parties.²⁶ They also seek to influence training materials used by civil service and civil society groups, such as removing the term 'Islamism' from training materials, which then allows for the ideology to go unchallenged. Their goal is not necessarily to pass "Islamist laws" immediately, but to shift the Overton Window – the range of policies considered acceptable, by gradually starting from ideas that are unthinkable and radical, through making them acceptable, then seen as sensible, becoming popular, and eventually turning into policy. This includes lobbying for Sharia-compliant financial products,²⁷ gender-segregated public services, or the weakening of counter-extremism programmes like Prevent.^{28,29} The Cordoba Foundation, described by former Prime Minister David Cameron as a "front for the Muslim Brotherhood,"³⁰ operates as a sophisticated think-tank and lobbying group. Led by Anas al-Tikriti (who served as President of the MAB), it focuses on "bridging the gap" between the West and the Muslim world. However, in practice, it often acts as a public relations arm for MB interests, lobbying against the proscription of the group and framing counter-terrorism measures as "Islamophobic."

A particularly insidious aspect of Muslim Brotherhood activity in the United Kingdom is the pattern of strategic entryism into national and local politics. Through affiliated networks and ideologically aligned individuals, MB-linked (or inspired by their ideology) actors have increasingly sought positions as councillors, parliamentary candidates, and special advisers. Once inside these institutions, they work to shape political discourse and influence policy and promote narratives that equate criticism of political Islam with racism. The risk is not dramatic overnight change, but the slow, incremental capture of policymaking spaces, the marginalisation of moderate Muslim voices, and the steady normalisation of separatist and anti-Western and other ideas that are

fundamentally incompatible with British democratic values within mainstream British politics.

• **Academia and Education:** The Muslim Brotherhood has established a significant foothold in British academia through its ideological influence over the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS), the umbrella body for Islamic societies on most UK university campuses.

The 2015 UK Government Muslim Brotherhood Review explicitly noted that MB-associated individuals and groups have exercised significant influence on FOSIS and other national student organisations, often through the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), which the review described as "dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood". FOSIS creates a closed loop environment for young Muslims, often platforming speakers who promote MB-style separatist identities and anti-Western rhetoric. By controlling the narrative on campus, FOSIS ensures that the next generation of professionals is schooled in an ideology that frames liberal democracy as a threat to faith. FOSIS has repeatedly voiced its objection to the Prevent program, calling for its abolition and labelling it 'Islamophobic'.^{31,32} These dynamics are compounded by emerging pro-Iran student networks that share ideological space with MB-affiliated groups, hosting speakers who glorify Iran's proxies (Hamas, Hezbollah) and depict Israel as a uniquely illegitimate state.³³ This radicalises the intellectual vanguard of the next generation, ensuring that future professionals and policymakers carry MB-aligned worldviews into their careers.

The degree of ideological radicalism and political posture within FOSIS is not static; historically, it fluctuates significantly depending on both the leanings of its leadership and external geopolitical catalysts. Because FOSIS operates as a broad student umbrella organisation, its positioning acts like a pendulum. The pendulum is violently accelerated by external flashpoints – most notably escalations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as the post-October 7 war in Gaza. During these periods of intense geopolitical crisis, domestic UK politics and campus environments undergo rapid polarisation. To maintain its legitimacy and capitalise on bottom-up student anger, FOSIS routinely pivots away from pastoral issues and toward a hardline, highly adversarial activist footing.³⁴ This shift is frequently characterised by the adoption of sharp 'them-and-

us' political rhetoric, cooperation with polarising external coalitions, and systemic campaigns designed to completely undermine and abolish state counter-radicalisation frameworks like the Prevent strategy.³⁵ Therefore, while its institutional foundations remain tied to the Brotherhood's legacy, its operational output must be evaluated as a highly reactive entity whose radicalism waxes and wanes in direct response to international conflicts and UK political pressures."

This entryism has enabled the gradual spread of anti-Western ideas, including the framing of British society and Western democracy as inherently hostile to Muslims, the promotion of Islamist separatism and victimhood narratives, and the normalisation of anti-Zionism as a gateway to antisemitism. MB-linked networks have hosted speakers who question the compatibility of Islam with secular democracy, campaigned to weaken or abolish the Prevent counter-extremism programme, and cultivated environments in which Islamist perspectives are presented as mainstream while criticism of political Islam is portrayed as "Islamophobic".

Recent concern over this influence prompted the United Arab Emirates in January 2026 to remove British universities from its list of approved institutions for state-funded scholarships, citing fears of MB-driven radicalisation on UK campuses.³⁶

This concern is compounded by Qatar's growing financial footprint in British higher education. As a major state sponsor of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar has poured hundreds of millions of pounds into UK universities—much of it 'unaccountable and often disguised'³⁷ – through research grants, endowed chairs, and partnerships, often with strings attached. These funds frequently correlate with heightened anti-Western and anti-Israel activism on campus, including the normalisation of Hamas-linked rhetoric and the suppression of criticism of political Islam. Such donations create pressure on institutions to self-censor, effectively advancing MB-style narratives under the guise of academic collaboration.³⁸ They seek not only to influence what we know about the Middle East and Islamism, but also 'to build influence within parliamentary and other official circles.'³⁹

This concern is echoed in reports of pro-Iran student societies operating across UK campuses, which promote anti-Western and anti-Israel narratives while

normalising hostility toward Jews. A February 2025 Jewish Chronicle investigation revealed a network of such groups at universities including SOAS, UCL, and King's College London, raising fears of foreign-backed radicalisation that complements MB-linked influence.⁴⁰

Additionally, MEND has fostered close ties with the National Education Union (NEU) and offers courses and workshops at the NEU.⁴¹ This is particularly concerning due to the many incidents of antisemitism within the NEU, with Jewish staff reporting it to be a hostile environment for Jews, and with the rising levels of antisemitism in British schools.⁴²

• **The Media:** Al-Hiwar TV is primary example of the MB's double discourse. It is the London-based television channel founded and led by senior figures with deep ties to the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and Hamas, such as Azzam al-Tamimi and Anas al-Tikriti. The station utilises the UK's permissive media environment to broadcast Islamist narratives across the Arab world.



While Al-Hiwar presents itself as a platform for "democratic dialogue," a report by the Community Security Trust reveals a pattern of platforming proscribed entities, including Hamas, and celebrating Hamas's October 7th massacre as a legitimate act of "resistance" and of promoting antisemitism and hostility towards Jews.⁴³ By operating with an Ofcom license in the heart of London, Al-Hiwar grants the movement a veneer of Western legitimacy while serving as its primary ideological mouthpiece in the Middle East.

Al Jazeera English (AJE) functions as the movement's most sophisticated global gateway, utilising a 'double discourse' to translate political Islamist objectives into

the Western vernacular of social justice and human rights. It is considered a trusted and moderate source of information.⁴⁴ However, while maintaining a veneer of professional impartiality, AJE consistently platforms Tier II and Tier III actors and frames MB-aligned movements as the “moderate” democratic alternative to regional autocracy. It also normalises and legitimises terrorism to Western audiences, and promotes mis- and disinformation that benefits extremists.⁴⁵⁴⁶

Recent revelations of Al Jazeera’s internal style guide (2023–2024 edition) further illustrate this double discourse. The guide explicitly prohibits staff from describing groups like al Qaeda, ISIS, or Boko Haram as “terrorist,” “Islamist,” or “extremist,” mandating neutral terms such as “armed group” or “fighters” instead. It also bars calling the Muslim Brotherhood an “Islamic/Islamist group”, insisting on framing it as committed to “peaceful political participation”.⁴⁷ Such rules normalise Islamist militancy for Western audiences while avoiding terms that would clearly identify threats – consistent with Qatar’s support for the MB and its proxies.

Beyond editorial bias, recent 2024/25 findings have further eroded the network’s credibility. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) and independent analysts have provided documentary evidence (personnel files and salary lists) alleging that several Gaza-based Al Jazeera correspondents held dual roles as active military commanders within Hamas – the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁴⁸ By shielding these actors with the protections of the press, the network serves as a critical infrastructure for the movement’s narratives against Western liberal orders.

Al Jazeera is owned by the government of Qatar – a major supporter of the MB, thereby influencing its messaging. As such, the channel is banned by countries that also ban or partially block the MB: Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, while Switzerland has placed a ban on Al Jazeera Arabic because of concerns about pro-terrorist propaganda.⁴⁹

3. Eroding Social Cohesion

The ultimate impact of MB activity is the steady erosion of British social cohesion. The movement promotes a “parallelism” – the idea that Muslims in the UK should exist in a state of self-imposed segregation, relying on MB-controlled charities, schools, and dispute-resolution services rather than the institutions of the state.

By providing “cradle-to-grave” services – including Islamic creches, mortuaries, Sharia marriage services, and legal advice – the MB reduces the interaction between Muslim citizens and the wider British public.⁵⁰ This separatist identity is reinforced by a narrative that frames liberal democratic values, such as freedom of speech, gender equality, and LGBT+ rights, as inherently hostile to Islamic faith. This creates fertile ground for radicalisation by convincing young people that they can never truly be both British and Muslim.

Muslim Brotherhood-linked and influenced organisations in the UK have frequently been accused of weaponising the term “Islamophobia” to stifle legitimate criticism of Islamist ideology, separatism, and specific policies such as opposition to the Prevent counter-extremism programme.

Groups including the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) along with MEND, routinely label scrutiny of political Islam, Sharia advocacy, or foreign funding as racist or “Islamophobic”. This tactic serves to portray critics as bigots while shielding MB networks from accountability. A 2018 Policy Exchange report documented how these groups deploy the charge against public figures and policies to control public discourse and undermine counter-terrorism efforts.⁵¹ Similarly, the Henry Jackson Society’s analysis of MEND showed the organisation using Islamophobia narratives to oppose counter-extremism legislation, promote conspiratorial claims about who “manufactures” anti-Muslim hatred, and gain institutional influence while resisting scrutiny.⁵²

The Muslim Brotherhood and Antisemitism

The Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) relationship with antisemitism is not a peripheral feature of its politics; it is a core ideological tenet. Since its inception, the movement has fused traditional Islamic themes with European-style conspiratorial antisemitism, creating a potent narrative that presents "the Jew" as an existential threat to Islam and the global order.⁵³ For British Jews, this ideology manifests as a sophisticated form of institutional hostility that often masks itself as political activism but has direct, sometimes violent, consequences.

The Brotherhood's founder, Hassan al-Banna, and its leading theorist, Sayyid Qutb, established a worldview in which Jews are portrayed as the ultimate "corruptors" of society. In his seminal essay *Our Struggle with the Jews*, Qutb argued that Jews have an inherent, eternal enmity toward Islam and are responsible for the world's moral and political decay.⁵⁴ This isn't just historical theology. Modern Brotherhood-linked journals, such as *al-Da'wa*, have consistently recycled the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, claiming that Jews control global finance and media to weaken Muslim nations. By spreading these conspiracies, the MB provides the intellectual scaffolding for contemporary antisemitism, rebranding it as "anti-Zionism" to make it palatable in Western liberal spheres.

While the MB in the UK often presents a moderate face to the public, its role as an ideological 'conveyor belt' is well-documented. By promoting a binary, "us-vs-them" world-view centred on anti-Jewish conspiracy theories of power and influence, the movement fosters an environment where violent extremism can take root.

As the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas's actions are the ultimate expression of MB ideology. The 7th October attacks were celebrated or excused by several MB-linked voices in the UK, creating a permissive environment for domestic antisemitism, which has risen significantly since October 2023.

Additionally, a report by the Henry Jackson Society on Britain's prison system, indicates that Islamist gangs, often drawing on MB-style narratives of Jewish "oppression," have incited violence behind bars. In one instance, prisoners were recorded shouting "death to the Jews" during Friday prayers following the 2023

attacks.⁵⁵ The report found that Muslim gangs that share the ideology of the MB 'proselytise, spread terrorist propaganda and enforce a fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia law. In many instances, they also threaten non-Muslim prisoners if they do not convert. Some do so out of fear.'

For the UK's Jewish community, the Brotherhood's influence creates a hostile environment in three key ways. By infiltrating academic and political spaces, MB-linked actors normalise the dehumanisation of Israelis and, by extension, of British Jews who support Israel. They often frame, or dismiss, Jewish concerns about antisemitism as bad faith attempts to silence criticism of Israel.

The MB promotes an identity that discourages integration. This tribalism often identifies the Jewish community as a "hostile other", eroding the social cohesion necessary for a safe, pluralistic Britain. The spike in antisemitic hate crimes reaching record levels since 2023, is frequently driven by the very narratives the MB excels at producing: that the Jewish state is uniquely evil and that those who support it are complicit in "crimes against humanity" or a "genocide". Worryingly, this narrative is often accepted as fact or is not sufficiently challenged by those in positions of responsibility; in politics, academia or the media.

In summary, the Muslim Brotherhood provides the respectable intellectual cover for a hatred that eventually spills over onto British streets. The movement acts as a primary engine of the antisemitism that now poses a genuine threat to the safety and future of British Jewry.

Hizb ut-Tahrir provides a particularly clear contemporary example of the intersection between Islamist ideology, antisemitism and the legitimisation of terrorism. The UK Government explicitly described HuT as antisemitic when announcing its proscription in January 2024.⁵⁶

The case is significant because the proscription was not based simply on historical antisemitic rhetoric. It followed the organisation's response to the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust: rather than condemning the deliberate murder and kidnapping of civilians, HuT celebrated the perpetrators and

presented the attack as legitimate political action. HuT therefore demonstrates how antisemitism can function not merely as prejudice but as part of a political worldview that legitimises violence. Its case also challenges attempts to draw a rigid distinction between “political” Islamist extremism and terrorism: where an organisation’s political propaganda celebrates terrorist violence and encourages its continuation, the ideological and operational boundaries become considerably less meaningful.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Role in Shaping UK Pro-Palestinian Activism

A defining feature of the UK’s pro-Palestinian protest movement since October 2023 has been the central organisational and ideological role played by groups with documented ties to the global MB network. While the marches draw a broad coalition that includes secular left-wing activists, the institutional core and narrative direction are heavily influenced by MB-linked organisations. This creates an alliance in which the MB supplies the organisational backbone, religious legitimacy, and long-term ideological framework, while secular partners provide mass mobilisation and political cover.

The largest demonstrations in London have consistently been organised by a formal coalition whose most influential members include:

- **Muslim Association of Britain (MAB):** a regular lead organiser and provides significant logistical and mobilising capacity.⁵⁷⁵⁸
- **Friends of Al-Aqsa (FOA):** Founded and led by Ismail Patel, who has openly praised Hamas (a MB affiliate) leaders, met Hamas figures in Gaza, and described the group as legitimate “resistance”.⁵⁹⁶⁰ Palestinian Forum in Britain (PFB): Led by Zaher Birawi, whom Israel has designated as a senior Hamas operative in Europe. PFB acts as a key bridge between UK activism and Hamas-linked international networks.⁶¹⁶²

These groups do not merely participate – they frequently set the tone, choose speakers, and determine messaging for the wider coalition (alongside the Palestine Solidarity Campaign and Stop the War Coalition). This gives MB-influenced actors disproportionate sway over the dominant narratives.

MB-linked organisations have successfully shifted the UK discourse from a territorial/political conflict into a civilisational and moral one:

- **“Genocide” framing:** The protests overwhelmingly characterise Israel’s campaign as deliberate genocide rather than a response to Hamas’s 7 October atrocities. This framing, heavily promoted by MAB, FOA, and PFB, seeks to delegitimise Israel’s right to self-defence, can and has promoted antisemitic blood-libels and aligns with the MB’s long-standing ideological view of Israel as an illegitimate colonial implant.
- **Normalisation of “Resistance”:** Terms such as “resistance” are routinely used to sanitise Hamas’s actions, including the 7 October massacre. Chants like “Khaybar Khaybar ya Yahud” (referencing a 7th-century massacre of Jews) and glorification of “martyrs” have become common at marches organised by these groups.
- **Zionist conspiracy narratives:** MB-affiliated media and speakers frequently portray the UK government and institutions as controlled by a “Zionist lobby”, using this to delegitimise counter-extremism measures (including Prevent) and security policies protecting Jewish communities.

This coalition has contributed to a permissive environment for antisemitism. Data from the Community Security Trust (CST) shows that since October 2023, over 50% of antisemitic incidents in the UK have been linked to the Israel-Gaza conflict, with many occurring in the context of protests dominated by these groups. The combination of MB ideology, with its deep historical antisemitic roots, with secular left-wing activism has produced a hybrid narrative that often promotes anti-Zionism and blurs it with antisemitic tropes.



Further in-depth study of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK

To further strengthen the strategic defence of British institutions, there is a pressing need for a more granular, state-level investigation into the Muslim Brotherhood's specific methods of operation within the Civil Service, civil society, and academia. While previous reviews have focused on the risk of violence, the 2025 analysis by the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) highlights a more subtle threat of "Strategic Entryism".⁶³ By placing ideologically aligned actors in professional and consultative roles, the movement effectively gains the keys to institutional gatekeeping, allowing them to neutralise counter-extremism policies and shape official narratives from the inside.

In the academic sphere, this infiltration has moved beyond student activism into the systematic targeting of faculty and administrative departments. Through ideological clustering in Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, MB-aligned networks use university platforms to normalise a worldview that is fundamentally hostile to the West. This environment serves as a professional pipeline, through which student activists are groomed for influential careers in law, media, and the Civil Service. The result is a self-sustaining ecosystem that exploits the language of social justice and "diversity" to shield Islamist objectives from scrutiny, often framing legitimate academic or security concerns as discriminatory to chill public debate.

The impact of this institutional capture is most visible in the alarming rise of systemic antisemitism and the fracturing of social cohesion. The movement has successfully captured mainstream Islamic discourse in Britain by using regional conflict as a vehicle to dehumanise Jewish communities and undermine the moral legitimacy of liberal democratic states. By forming "Red-Green" alliances with progressive groups, the Brotherhood has integrated its separatist agenda into the broader civil society framework. This makes the task of countering their narrative increasingly difficult, as their ideological goals are now frequently indistinguishable from secular activism, necessitating a sophisticated "Counter-Infiltration" strategy that can distinguish between genuine community representation and a coordinated political project.

To effectively protect our democracy, the UK must move toward a model of "Institutional Defence" that audits the epistemic influence of foreign-funded chairs and research centres in our universities. We must identify the specific individuals and organisations that facilitate this entryism, ensuring that public policy and civil society remain resilient against those who use our freedoms to foster division. Only by understanding the mechanics of how these narratives are mainstreamed can we hope to restore a shared sense of national belonging and protect the safety of the Jewish community and other minorities from the toxic effects of political Islamist ideology.

Proscription and Counter-Measures: Navigating the Legal and Policy Landscape

The question of how the British state should treat the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is one of the most complex challenges in contemporary counter-extremism policy. While several Middle Eastern allies have moved to ban the group entirely, the United Kingdom faces a unique set of legal and operational hurdles. Proscription is a powerful tool, but its application to a fragmented movement like the MB requires an understanding of both the law and the movement's deceptive architecture.

Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary has the power to proscribe an organisation if they believe it is concerned with terrorism. This is defined as committing, preparing for, promoting, encouraging, or being otherwise concerned with terrorism.

For the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK, reaching this legal threshold is difficult. Unlike Al-Qaeda or ISIS, the MB operates in the West through political and civil structures rather than carrying out or claiming responsibility for violent attacks on British soil. The

2015 government report concluded that while the MB's ideology is a "conveyor belt" to radicalisation, the movement as a whole in the UK did not, at that time, meet the statutory test for proscription as a terrorist group.⁶⁴

However, legal plausibility changes when looking at specific chapters. The UK has already proscribed Hamas in its entirety; Hamas is explicitly the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, the precedent exists for banning MB offshoots that engage in or support violence.

The proscription of Hizb ut-Tahrir also provides an important precedent. The decision applied to the global organisation and its UK branch, Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain after the Government's assessment was that the organisations met the statutory threshold.

The HuT precedent demonstrates that an organisation does not have to be structured like Al-Qaeda or ISIS, or to have a conventional history of carrying out terrorist attacks itself, in order to meet the statutory test. The decisive question is whether the organisation is concerned in terrorism, including through the promotion or encouragement of terrorism. This is relevant to the Muslim Brotherhood debate because it suggests that the legal assessment should focus on the activities, structures and propaganda of the organisation and

its constituent branches rather than assuming that an Islamist movement is necessarily outside the terrorism framework because it presents itself primarily as a political or social movement.

However, a more legally plausible route, similar to the approach taken by the United States, involves the targeted proscription of specific foreign chapters or "front" groups that provide material support to terrorism. The US has designated entities like HASM and Liwa al-Thawra (MB-linked insurgent groups in Egypt) as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).⁶⁵ As previously referenced, in 2026, the US Treasury and State Department also designated the Egyptian and Jordanian MB branches as terror organisations.⁶⁶

In the UK, the benefits of an American-style surgical proscription would be significant:

- It would allow the government to freeze assets and prevent the UK from being used as a financial hub for MB-linked entities involved in regional conflicts.
- It would provide clear grounds to refuse visas or deport individuals associated with these violent offshoots.
- It sends a clear signal to UK-based "Tier II" affiliates that their ideological or financial links to violent foreign branches are under active state scrutiny.

Beyond Proscription: Defining and Targeting "Extremism"

The primary obstacle to any form of proscription or sanction is the MB's masterclass in dissimulation and strategic ambiguity. Most Western-based, Brotherhood-linked activists go to great lengths to hide their ties to the movement. As noted by the GWU Program on Extremism, Tier II and Tier III organisations often adopt names that sound impeccably civic and universal – focusing on "Human Rights," "Muslim Affairs", or "Student Services."

This makes identifying which organisations are truly linked to the movement a significant intelligence challenge. These groups operate with structural independence, meaning there is often no paper trail or membership list linking a UK charity back to the MB.

They share the ideology, but they do not share the letterhead. Consequently, a blanket ban on the Muslim Brotherhood would likely be legally toothless, as few organisations in the UK actually use that name.

If the legal threshold for terrorism cannot be met, the state must move toward a civil and administrative

"They share the ideology, but they do not share the letterhead. Consequently, a blanket ban would likely be legally toothless"

strategy to counter infiltration. Lord Walney proposed an amendment to the Crime and Policing Bill (now Act) that would have created a new proscription category, for violent extremist protest groups that do not cross the terrorism threshold.⁶⁷ This approach could be used for MB-aligned groups that promote, or create a permissive environment, for political violence and extremist ideologies, encourage law-breaking or promote ideologies that undermine British democracy. The amendment concerned protest groups, but a similar category could be created to capture any other groups, including charities, student unions, and civil society organisations.

Additionally, the UK Government’s revised definition of extremism (2024) focuses on the “negation of fundamental British values.” By officially designating Tier II affiliates (like MAB) as extremist organisations, the government could – and should - implement a strict “non-engagement” policy. This would bar these groups from receiving any public funding, prevent their members from sitting on government advisory boards or interfaith panels, and ensure that the Civil Service,

local authorities and other public bodies treat them as hostile actors rather than “community partners.”

The UK can also look to France’s “Anti-Separatism” Law (2021) as a blueprint. France has moved to shut down organisations that promote an ideology hostile to the Republic, regardless of whether they have committed a specific act of terror. This includes a “Charter of Principles” for French Islam, which requires groups to renounce political Islam, reassert commitment to full gender equality, refusal of extremist messages of violence, hate, racism and terrorism, a rejection of practices such as forced marriages and honour violence, rejection of foreign interference including control over religious institutions and fully belonging to the national community and its values.⁶⁸ This framework could be adapted in the UK to ensure that any charity or educational body receiving public funds or tax-exempt status must formally commit to maintaining compliance with the Equality Act 2010, upholding the primacy of UK law over parallel legal systems, and rejecting discriminatory or anti-democratic practices.

Stopping the Infiltration of Institutions

Apart from proscription of certain groups, several actions might be taken to halt the MB’s entryism into academia, the civil service, and politics:

1. Strengthen Social Cohesion & Reduce Separatism	• Require all faith-based charities and religious institutions receiving public money or tax relief to sign a universal “British Values Charter”, explicitly rejecting separatism, extremism, hostility to liberal British values, and foreign interference. Even if this is not binding, institutions seeking official recognition or state support should be expected to align with it or lose funds and charity status. • Introduce foreign funding transparency for all religious institutions.⁶⁹ • Mandate English-language proficiency and British citizenship education for imams and all other religious leaders entering the UK to preach.
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**2. Counter Islamist
Influence at Universities**

- Universities that fail to protect Jewish students or allow MB-linked societies to host antisemitic speakers should face sanctions.
- Require universities to publish annual foreign donation reports (especially from Qatar, Turkey, and MB-linked foundations) and subject large donations to scrutiny by the Office for Students.
- Reform student union governance so that FOSIS-affiliated Islamic societies cannot dominate “equality” or “diversity” committees, which are used to push anti-Western and anti-Jewish narratives. FOSIS-affiliated societies should also be placed under special scrutiny to make sure they do not promote Islamist and antisemitic narratives.

**3. Extended Powers for
Charity Regulation**

Expand the Charity Commission’s powers to proactively investigate and remove charitable status from organisations that promote separatism, hatred towards groups of protected characteristics or glorify “martyrdom” culture (even if they avoid direct calls for terrorism or violence).

**4. Extremist
Influence Register**

Create a publicly available “Extremist Influence Register” of organisations and individuals with documented MB links, so public bodies, including universities, schools, civil service, local authorities and Parliament, know who they should not partner with. These public bodies should also sign a ‘British Values Charter’ as a pledge not to promote ideologies that undermine British liberal values and democratic institutions, and extremism, including political Islam. The UK should also make it legally possible to ban engagement between trade unions and groups or individuals designated as extremist, because unions are a major entry point for indoctrination into MB-aligned ideology.

**5. Non-Violent Extremism
Reform in Prevent**

Strengthen Prevent by ensuring it properly addresses non-violent Islamist ideology as a radicalisation pathway (the current version is too focused on violence only).

**6. Enhanced Vetting
Protocols**

Enhanced vetting for civil servants and special advisors must include a focus on “ideological proximity” to extremist networks. Currently, vetting often misses MB entryists because they do not belong to proscribed groups.

**7. Supplementary School &
Curriculum Oversight**

The Department for Education must increase oversight of “supplementary schools” and academies where Tier III “Trojan Horse” narratives can take root. The goal is to ensure that no publicly funded or state-regulated space is used to teach a separatist identity that frames Britishness and Islam as a zero-sum game. Schools should also offer better education into Islamist ideology, conspiracy theories, and the compatibility of political Islam with liberal democracy.

8. Ofcom Broadcast & Impartiality Audits

We recommend that Ofcom exercises its ongoing statutory duty under the Broadcasting Act 1990 to conduct a ‘Fit and Proper’⁷⁰ person review of Al-Hiwar TV and Al Jazeera English, utilising the 2024 Extremism Definition as the benchmark for regulatory suitability. It should also evaluate whether repeated breaches of codes for the station can mandate removing its licence. Furthermore, under the Media Act 2024, Ofcom should mandate a due impartiality and due accuracy audit to ensure that English-language output is not being used as a deceptive ‘soft power’ shield for radicalising narratives.

9. Code of Conduct Reforms for Elected Officials

A critical but under-utilised tool to counter Muslim Brotherhood entryism is the reform of codes of conduct for public office holders. The current Parliamentary Code for MPs (including independents) and local councillors’ codes lack specific provisions addressing ideological infiltration, undisclosed associations with extremist-linked networks, or the promotion of separatist or anti-Western agendas. Strengthening these codes should require mandatory declaration of affiliations with organisations identified as extremist or having documented Muslim Brotherhood connections, clear prohibitions on advancing political Islamist objectives under the guise of community representation, and restrictions on accepting platforms or partnerships with groups subject to government non-engagement policies. Sanctions for breaches must be meaningful and enforceable, ranging from formal reprimand and suspension (with loss of salary or allowances) to removal from office in serious or repeated cases. For MPs, this could include activation of the Recall of MPs Act when public confidence is lost; for councillors, independent standards committees should gain the power to disqualify individuals. Without such reforms, elected officials can continue to lend legitimacy and influence to MB-linked networks with little more than a mild rebuke. Updating these codes would draw clear red lines, deter entryism, and help restore trust that British democratic institutions are not being quietly captured from within.

10. Updated State-Level Review of Muslim Brotherhood Networks

An updated, government-backed, in-depth review of the methods used by the MB and their sphere of influence in the UK will help inform broader and more effective policies.

Conclusion

The Muslim Brotherhood thrives in the “grey zone” between legitimate civil society and violent extremism. While proscribing the entire movement may be legally fraught due to the lack of a formal UK branch, a combination of targeted proscription of foreign entities and a rigorous administrative “non-engagement” policy at home is the only way to safeguard liberal democracy. By stripping these groups of their state-sanctioned legitimacy, we can empower the genuine, reformist Muslim voices that the Brotherhood has spent decades trying to silence.

At its core, the Brotherhood’s participationist ideology is fundamentally incompatible with the liberal values that define modern Britain. Where liberal democracy champions the rights of the individual, the movement promotes a totalising social order that demands conformity. Its documented history of systemic antisemitism and hostility toward women’s rights and the LGBTQ+ community serves as a warning; their influence on campus and in civil society creates a hostile environment for those who do not adhere to their rigid worldview, particularly Jewish students and secular Muslims.

Perhaps the greatest threat is the Brotherhood’s role as an ideological conveyor belt. While its various entities often avoid direct calls to violence, they systematically cultivate a separatist mindset that frames the Western

state as an inherent enemy of Islam. This cultural soil is what allows violent radicalisation to take root. By dehumanising groups of people – whether through anti-Zionist tropes or anti-Western rhetoric and conspiracy theories—the movement provides the moral justification for those who eventually turn to terror.

Recent international security reviews and domestic reports point to the same conclusion: the safe haven currently enjoyed by the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK is a strategic liability. Our democracy cannot remain resilient if we allow a hostile, foreign-linked movement to monopolise the representation of British citizens. Protecting our liberal values requires moving beyond a reactive counter-terrorism mindset toward a proactive counter-infiltration strategy, starving the spider of its web by enforcing transparency and defending the secular, democratic space the Brotherhood seeks to close.

Fighting the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK means fighting ideas more than a group of people. This means that our liberal freedoms and democratic system that make our core values, are also our weakness when fighting ideas and ideologies. However, it is key to recognise that there is no place in our society for ideas that subvert our values, undermine our security, and divide our society ideologically and by promoting large-scale separatism.

“Protecting our liberal values requires moving beyond a reactive counter-terrorism mindset toward a proactive counter-infiltration strategy.”

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The Antisemitism Policy Trust's mission is to educate and empower parliamentarians, policy makers and opinion formers to address antisemitism. It provides the secretariat to the British All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism and works internationally with parliamentarians and others to address antisemitism. The Antisemitism Policy Trust is focussed on educating and empowering decision makers in the UK and across the world to effectively address antisemitism.

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